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Interest Rate Smoothing and Macroeconomic 
Instability under Post–Capital Account 
Liberalization Turkey1*
Hasan Cömert, A. Erinç Yeldan, and Gökçe Akın Olçum 
Abstract )is paper considers the interest rate policy of the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey (CBRT) in the post–*nancial liberalization and deregulation era. We *nd that (1) 
the Bank’s interest rate smoothing tendency is the main determinant of its monetary policy in 
this period, (2) the CBRT does not seem to be responsive to the developments in real economy 
(output), and (3) although in.ation targeting central banks are not supposed to pay attention 
to exchange rates, the CBRT appears to be slightly responsive to changes in real exchange rate. 
In answer to the question of whether there is a deeper underlying structural constraint binding 
the CBRT’s “independence,” it seems clear that the global *nancial system is restricting the 
ability of the central banks to pursue “independent” policy objectives.
Résumé L’article aborde la politique des taux d’intérêt de la Banque centrale de la 
République de la Turquie (BCRT) durant la période qui a suivi la libéralisation et la déré-
glementation des marchés *nanciers. Les auteurs constatent que : (1) durant cette période, 
le facteur déterminant de la politique monétaire de la BCRT a été sa tendance à modi*er à 
petite dose les taux d’intérêt; (2) la BCRT ne semble pas avoir réagi aux faits nouveaux dans 
l’économie réelle (production); et (3) même si les banques centrales ayant une cible d’in.ation 
ne sont pas censées prêter attention au taux de change, la BCRT semble avoir réagi un peu aux 
variations du taux de change réel. Quant à savoir si une structure sous-jacente plus profonde 
exercerait une contrainte qui limite « l’indépendance » de la BCRT, la réponse est claire : le sys-
tème *nancier mondial restreint la capacité des banques centrales de poursuivre des objectifs 
« indépendants » en matière de politiques.
1.  * An earlier version of this paper was presented at University of Massachusetts, Amherst - New 
School Economics Graduate Student Workshop, 26–28 October 2008 at Amherst. We are grateful to 
Vuslat Us Alioğlu and Hakan Kırklar for their help in gathering data and to the participants of the 
workshop, Michael Ash, Geo)rey Woglom, Ebru Voyvoda, James Crotty, Gerald Epstein, Hakan 
Berument, and Ümit Özlale, for their comments and suggestions on earlier dra*s of the paper. 
Research for this paper was initiated when Erinç Yeldan was a visiting Fulbright scholar at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, Amherst, for which he acknowledges the generous support of the J. William 
Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and the hospitality of the Political Economy Research Institute 
at UMass, Amherst.
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Introduction: From In!ation Targeting to Interest Rate 
Smoothing
<e art of modern central banking has gone through profound changes over the last 
two decades. A*er long, and at times futile, debates on the speci=cation of the macro 
aggregate that is to be targeted, or on the optimality characteristics of the so-called “ob-
jective functions,” the 1990s had witnessed a new sanctimony, calling itself “in>ation 
targeting” (IT).2 Perhaps more properly referred as “in>ation forecast targeting,” the 
approach was initially announced in New Zealand as a set of policy guidelines to help 
reduce the markets’ uncertainties in a volatile global market. With the accumulated 
experiences of the crises in East Asia in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Turkey 
and Argentina in 2001, such perceptions were further =nessed and evolved into new 
concepts such as “institutional and instrument independence,” “credibility,” “expecta-
tions management,” and “transparency.” 
As the IT framework deepened and became elevated to the status of the new norm 
of global orthodoxy, new institutional mechanisms were also devised, such as estab-
lishing a “monetary policy board” with a pre-announced meeting calendar and open 
public display of the board’s meetings, along with the disclosure of voting behaviour 
of its members, to “facilitate transparency” of the bank’s intentions. In this vein, many 
developing countries have changed their central bank laws in order to decrease the 
in>uence of democratically elected governments on central banks (CBs).
Following this trend, the orthodox approach has continued to exclusively emphasize 
indirect, market-based instruments, such as short term interest rates, as the primary 
tool of monetary policy (Masson, Savastano, and Sharma 1997).3 Given this exclusive 
focus on price stability via interest rate responses, however, there has been a concomi-
tant common observation that historical responses of the nominal interest rates to 
shocks have been signi=cantly more gradual and sticky than the optimal policies called 
for by the e?ciency rules generated from intertemporal consumption smoothing 
(Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey) models. To account for this fact, some authors noted an 
2.   In broad terms, the IT policy framework involves “the public announcement of in>ation 
targets, coupled with a credible and accountable commitment on the part of government policy 
authorities to the achievement of these targets” (Setter=eld 2006, 653). In addition, in>ation targeting 
is usually associated with appropriate changes in the central bank law that enhance the independence 
of the institution (Bernanke et. al. 1999,102; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001, 8; see also Buiter 
2006 for an evaluation). For a recent assessment of the in>ation targeting regimes, see Epstein and 
Yeldan (2008) and the special issues in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (2006, Vol. 28, No. 
4) and International Review of Applied Economics (2008, Vol. 22, No. 2).
3.   Note, for instance, the Bank of England’s policy mandate: “One of the Bank of England’s two 
core purposes is monetary stability [the other core purpose is =nancial stability – authors’ note]. 
Monetary stability means stable prices—low in>ation—and con=dence in the currency. Stable prices 
are de=ned by the Government’s in>ation target, which the Bank seeks to meet through the decisions 
on interest rates taken by the Monetary Policy Committee” (Bank of England n.d.) [emphases added].
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evident desire on the part of the IT-central banks to smooth their rates of interest—over 
and above the openly stated objective of achieving price stability.4
<is desire for interest rate smoothing has gradually emerged as the main underly-
ing motive of the modern CBs under the age of =nancial globalization. Consequently, 
in an attempt to secure investor con=dence and credibility, the CBs have come to be 
increasingly constrained to maintain a high and constant rate of interest in their opera-
tions. <e purpose of this paper is to support this assertion with evidence from a newly 
“emerging market economy,” Turkey.
Turkey’s recent macroeconomic history provides an interesting case study in the 
IT literature with its prolonged experience of persistent, inertial, and moderately high 
rates of in>ation (at around a plateau of 60–70% per annum) and highly volatile cycli-
cal boom-bust growth episodes. Turkey completed its capital account deregulation in 
1989, and in the relatively short time span since then it has experienced no less than 
three major economic crises. <e latest of these erupted in early 2001, during which 
time Turkey was following an IMF-led disin>ation program. <e announcement of 
the independence of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) came shortly 
a*erwards in that year. <e CBRT announced in October of 2001 that it would follow 
an implicit/disguised in>ation targeting rule until conditions were ready for full target-
ing, which was declared o?cially on January 1, 2006.
In what follows in this paper, we seek to provide answers to the following questions: 
(1) How did the CBRT’s policy objectives and strategic instruments evolve a*er the 
onset of explicit in>ation targeting? (2) What were the main determinants of the Bank’s 
interest rates? And in particular, (3) has IT changed the responsiveness of the CBRT to 
di)erent macroeconomic indicators? 
To this end, we will use a central bank reaction function framework, which, in some 
ways, can be seen as an expanded Taylor Rule regression, over 2002–2008. Here our 
aim is not to reveal the CBRT’s o?cial monetary policy rules per se, but rather to docu-
ment ex post the behaviour of the CBRT while operating under its o?cial guidelines 
and responding to the conditionalities imposed by the international =nance commu-
nity. We =nd that over this extended time horizon, during when signi=cant shi*s in 
the macroeconomic environment have occurred, the CBRT’s almost exclusive focus on 
interest rate smoothing has not changed and the CBRT has not shown any signi=cant 
response to swings in the business cycles. <is raises the question of whether there is 
a deeper underlying structural constraint binding the CBRT’s “instrument-independ-
ence” in its conduct of monetary policy. We trace the basis of this structural constraint 
to the nature of the global =nancial system restricting the ability of the central banks to 
pursue independent policy objectives.
4.   See, for example, Srour (2001); Lowe and Ellis (1998); Sack (1998a, 1998b); Drew and Plan-
tier (2000); Mehra (2001); Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2003); and Woodford (2002) for a 
detailed analysis of measuring the interest rate smoothing. In its most succinct form, the argument is 
that monetary authorities are assumed to minimize a loss function of the form: Minimize (β1var(yt) + 
β2var(Pt) + β3var(it – it-1) ) where yt is real output; Pt is the price level; and it is the interest rate instru-
ment. Var(.) denotes the variance of the associated variables, and β1, β2 , β3 are positive coe?cients.
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<e remainder of the paper is organized in four further sections. Firstly, we provide 
a brief overview of the literature on interest rate smoothing, which is in turn followed 
by a section giving a short monetary history of Turkey since full capital account lib-
eralization. We implement our econometric assessments in the next section. And the 
=nal section summarizes and concludes.
I. Empirical Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing
<ere is now a signi=cant body of accumulated empirical evidence suggesting that 
CBs tend to change their policy interest rates only gradually and that they reveal even 
greater reluctance to initiate reversals. It was argued by Lowe and Ellis as early as 1998 
that the interest rate smoothing strategy has been an important part of central banks’ 
policies in the US, Japan, and Germany. Goodhart (1998) documents similar results 
in France, Italy, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Australia. In this re-
gard, Srour (2001) cites further evidence from the monetary history of 12 industrial-
ized economies where the CBs respond gradually to economic shocks, moving their 
interest rates in relatively small discrete steps in the same direction. Based on time se-
ries econometrics, Srour’s results indicate that there is a sustained divergence between 
the historically realized responses of nominal interest rates and the optimal responses 
as suggested by the conventional loss functions.5 Some economists even try to =nd 
optimum interest rate smoothing rules (Woodford 2002). Some claim interest rate 
smoothing can decrease volatility and contribute to stability under certain conditions 
(Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe 2003). In this vein, Woodford (2002, 2) claims 
that “a concern with interest rate smoothing on the part of a central bank can have de-
sirable consequences. <is is because such an objective can result in history-dependent 
central bank behaviour which, when anticipated by the private sector, can serve the 
bank’s stabilization objectives through the e)ects upon current outcomes of anticipated 
future policy.” In contrast, however, one might also argue that in many cases it can also 
be interpreted as an indication of “constrained/passive” central banking. <is would be 
the case especially if other economic variables are not claimed as being signi=cant in 
explaining movements in the central banks’ interest rates.
Several theoretical explanations had been advanced to account for this phenomenon. 
<e =rst is based on arguments of attaining and maintaining “credibility” in an uncer-
tain and o*en hostile world of international =nance. Monetary authorities o*en =nd 
it more e)ective to commit to a given level of its main instrument—the interest rate 
over extended periods of time—rather than creating the image that “they are lost in the 
5.   Similarly, Drew and Plantier (2003, 3) argue that “in general terms models that are typically 
used by researchers … normally suggest fairly rapid and aggressive responses of short term interest 
rates, even under a >exible approach.”
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dark.”6 <e threat of capital >ight in an uncertain domain warrants the CBs to follow 
“predictable” rules. In order to reduce the risks associated with increased =nancializa-
tion (see, among others, Crotty 2007; Epstein 2005; Stiglitz 2000, 2002; Grabel 1995), 
the CBs are o*en committed to follow simple and well-de=ned rules in the name of 
accountability and transparency.7 Fearing that they would lose credibility, the CBs o*en 
prefer to follow smooth interest rate paths, even if “optimality rules” from their econo-
metric models suggest otherwise. Second, and related to this, is the relevant concern for 
avoiding =nancial instability. <e CBs are conditioned by the markets to avoid frequent 
variations in its instruments that would cause large swings in asset prices and =nancial 
rates of return. Such swings could cause insolvencies in public debt and might have a 
severe negative impact on corporate balance sheets. For instance, Cukierman (1996) 
argues that this is a very important factor behind the Fed’s interest rate smoothing 
strategy. <ird, but not least, persisting uncertainties might force central banks to ad-
just their interest rates only gradually. <ere are di)erent types of uncertainties that can 
be used to explain the interest rate smoothing phenomena. Central banks are uncertain 
about the impacts of their tools on their economies (known as parametric uncertainty 
in the literature); the state of their economies (known as modelling uncertainty); the 
reliability of existing data (data uncertainty), and the characteristics and magnitude 
of future shocks. By using a VAR model, Sack (1998a) argues that a signi=cant part of 
interest rate smoothing can be attributed to parametric uncertainty.
In our view, the origins of all these ideas have much to do with increased =nancial-
ization of the world economy and intensi=ed pressures for capital deregulation.8 “End 
the =nancial repression!” were the battle cries of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
championing the elimination of all controls that inhibit free movement of capital across 
the globe and urging the national CBs to liberalize their credit markets by abandoning 
all interest ceilings. To this end, the integration of the developing nation-economies 
into the evolving world =nancial system has been achieved through a series of policies 
aimed at liberalizing their =nancial sectors and privatizing major industries. 
6.   From a di)erent perspective, Caplin and Leahy (1996) advance a similar motivation. <ey 
argue that policymakers do not like frequent and sudden interest rate changes because they do not 
want to give an impression that they are poorly informed. 
7.   A 2007 study by JP Morgan states, for instance, that “the incremental gain of credibility from 
central banks’ e)orts to increase dialogue and accountability is minimal. What really matters in the 
current conjuncture is maintaining clear and predictable rules for interest rates” (JP Morgan, Daily 
Report, 14 May 2007).
8.   Financialization, as it stands, is a loose term and no consensus yet exists among economists 
on its de=nition. However, starting from David Harvey’s seminal observation that “something sig-
ni=cant has changed in the way capitalism has been working since about 1970” (Harvey 1990), a set 
of distinguishing characteristics of the concept can be unveiled. Krippner (2006, 174), in line with 
Arrighi’s %e Long Twentieth Century (1994), de=nes it as a pattern of accumulation in which pro=ts 
accrue primarily through =nancial channels rather than through trade and commodity production. 
According to Epstein (2005, 3) “=nancialization means the increasing role of =nancial motives, =nan-
cial markets, =nancial actors and =nancial institutions in the operation of domestic and international 
economies.” In what follows, in a broader way, we can consider =nancialization as a phenomenon 
that can be described by increasing =nancial motives, volume of =nancial activities, and impact of 
=nancial activities within and among countries.
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<e orthodox attempted to explain the motives behind =nancial liberalization by 
arguing that such measures would restore growth and stability by raising savings and 
improving economic e?ciency. Accordingly, as the “strangulation” of =nancial repres-
sion is dismantled, loanable funds would expand, the real cost of credit would fall, and 
the consequent increases in the pace of capital accumulation would generate sustained 
growth. <is claim, referred to as the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, provided the theo-
retical backbone of the neo-liberal orthodoxy advocating =nancial deregulation and 
liberalization.
<e reality, however, has been quite di)erent. Following full->edged =nancial lib-
eralization, those developing economies that underwent =nancial deregulation found 
themselves trapped within high and persistent real interest rates. <ey also bore witness 
to a self-distorting foreign exchange market operating through attacks of speculative 
hot money >ows into the fragile and shallow asset markets, luring residents to over-
zealous spending and excessive debt accumulation. Furthermore, contrary to expecta-
tions, the post-liberalization episodes were aFicted with the divergence of domestic 
savings away from =xed capital investments towards speculative =nancial instruments 
with o*en erratic and volatile yields. 
Turkey has been one of the critical examples of such cases, given its repeated (specu-
lative) expansion-fragility-crisis episodes since its post–capital account liberalization in 
late 1989. It is to this subject we now turn.
II. "e Central Bank of Turkey under Post–Capital 
Account Liberalization 
Turkey completed its =nancial liberalization with full deregulation of the capital ac-
count in August 1989. Consequently, with the advent of elimination of controls on 
foreign capital transactions and the declaration of convertibility of the Turkish lira in 
1989, Turkey opened up its domestic asset markets to global =nancial competition. In 
this setting, the Central Bank had to abandon its traditional instruments of monetary 
control and became directly vulnerable to the speculative conditions of =nancial arbi-
trage in the global markets. 
<e immediate three year period a*er the 1989 reforms was marked by the virtual 
elimination of the foreign exchange gap that had crippled the Turkish macro balances 
for almost four decades. With the eruption of “hot money” in>ows enabling abundant 
foreign exchange, Turkish commodity markets were suddenly >ooded with cheap im-
ports. Erratic movements in the current account, a rising trade de=cit (from 3.5% of 
GNP in 1985–88 to 6% in 1990–93 and then up to 8% in 2000–01), and a drastic dete-
rioration of =scal balances showed the unsustainability of the post-1989 model, with the 
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eruption of severe =nancial crises in April 1994 and February 2001.9 In Boratav, Türel 
and Yeldan’s (1995) words, 
… the post-1990 Turkish experience shows the serious problems confronting 
a developing economy which decides to move into full external and internal 
deregulation in the =nancial system under conditions of high in>ation. <e 
specter of capital >ight becomes the dominant motive in policy-making and 
creates commitment to high interest rates and expectations for cheap foreign 
exchange. <e links of these two policy variables with the real sphere of the 
economy, i.e., investment on physical capital and the current account balance 
of payments, are deeply severed. Instability in the rates of foreign exchange 
and interest rates creates feedbacks which lead the economy into further in-
stability. (22)
In Figure 1 below, we document the paths of consumer price in>ation and the rates of 
interest on credit and the government’s debt instruments (GDIs) along with the over-
night (O/N) interest rate of the Central Bank following capital account liberalization. 
<e turmoil following the currency crises of 1994 and 2001 is clearly visible. <e rate of 
in>ation, which hovered around the plateau of 60–80% through the 1990s, could have 
=nally been brought under control a*er 2003. Despite the positive achievements on 
the disin>ation front, rates of interest remained slow to adjust. <e real rate of interest 
remained above 15% through much of the post–2001 crisis era and generated heavy 
pressures on the =scal authority over meeting its debt obligations. <e persistence of 
real interest rates, on the other hand, had also been conducive to attracting heavy >ows 
of short term speculative =nance capital over 2003 and 2006. <is pattern continued 
into 2007 at an even stronger rate.
9.   For a thorough review of the post –1989 capital account liberalization era in Turkey, see Biçer 
and Yeldan (2003); Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan (2000); Boratav and Yeldan (2006); and Ertugrul 
and Selcuk (2001).
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Figure 1. Consumer price in!ation and selected interest rates in post–"nancial liberalization Turkey
 
Source: CBRT, www.tcmb.gov.tr.
On the monetary policy front, the CBRT was granted its independence from political 
authority in October 2001. What followed was that the central bank announced that its 
sole mandate was to restore and maintain price stability in the domestic markets and 
that it would follow implicit in>ation targeting until conditions were ready for full tar-
geting. <us, over 2002 and 2003, the CBRT targeted its “net domestic asset position” 
as a prelude to full in>ation targeting. Finally on January 1, 2006, the CBRT announced 
that it would adopt full->edged in>ation targeting. <e Bank’s current mandate is to set 
a “point” target of 5% in>ation for consumer prices. Given internal and external shocks, 
the Bank has recognized an internal (of 1%) and an external (of 2%) “uncertainty” band 
around the point target. <us, the Bank will try to keep the in>ation rate at its point 
target, while recognizing a band of maximum 2 percentage points below or above the 
5% target rate. <e Bank has announced that it will continue to use the overnight inter-
est rates as its main policy tool to reach its target. It is stated explicitly that the “sole 
objective of the CBRT is to provide price stability,” and that all other possible objectives 
are out of its policy realm.10
10.   Further institutional details of the Central Bank’s in>ation targeting framework can be found 
in the December 2005 document, General Framework of In>ation Targeting Regime and Monetary 
and Exchange Rate Policy for 2006 (CBRT 2005). Turkey’s experience with the implicit in>ation 
targeting era can be found in Kara (2006).
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One of the earlier attempts to estimate an (implicit) monetary policy function of 
the CBRT is the seminal paper by Berument and Malatyali (2000). Using a general-
ized form of a Taylor-type reaction function over 1989.07 to 1997.03 Berument and 
Malatyali found that the CBRT has targeted M2Y growth and that neither real nor 
nominal depreciation was sought. <ey also report that, over the 1990s, the CBRT has 
not targeted currency issued, M2, net domestic assets, or net foreign assets, nor has it 
taken any of the budget de=cit measures into account while determining its monetary 
policy. A similar result was also deduced by Kaya (2006), where within a generalized 
Taylor form of monetary policy rule, Kaya reports that none of the conventional macro 
aggregates yield a statistically signi=cant explanation of the behaviour of the CBRT’s 
short term interest rate over the post-1990 period.
<e above results were put to a further test in Berument and Tasci (2004), where 
the authors suggest that over the 1990s the CBRT actually used the spread between 
the interbank rate and the rate of nominal depreciation as its main policy rate, rather 
than the simple short term interest rate. Considering monthly data from January 1990 
to October 2000, Berument and Tasci found that the CBRT responded to its foreign 
exchange reserves, output, and M2 growth and that it targeted neither the future nor 
the lagged in>ation rate. In other words, in the period immediately following capital 
account liberalization, the CBRT was more concerned with the stability of the markets 
than with in>ation. 
Us (2004, 2006) further studied alternative monetary rules for the CBRT under the 
in>ation targeting regime using a small-scale macroeconomic model. She argues that 
in setting forward rules for macro stabilization, a monetary policy rule driven by a 
monetary condition index (MCI) is superior to a simple Taylor Rule framework and 
that the exchange rate is an important variable in driving the policy reaction function. 
Us’s (2006) results were contrasted in Karasoy, Kunter, and Us (2006), who, utilizing a 
similar macroeconometric model, studied the channels under which monetary policy is 
transmitted within an IT regime. <eir results indicate that at a time of weak domestic 
demand, the output gap has been seemingly less signi=cant in determining in>ation. 
Risk premium as measured by “Embi+ Turkey” was found to have a high explanatory 
power in shaping government borrowing rate and the exchange rate. However, Kara-
soy, Kunter, and Us found no direct relationship between primary surplus (as a ratio 
to the GNP) and in>ation, corroborating Kaya’s (2006) results.
III. "e Econometrics of Interest Rate Smoothing
Given the above background, we now turn our attention to the investigation of how the 
CBRT reacted to changes in the economic conditions from 2002 to the end of 2008. For 
this purpose, we will bene=t from a central bank reaction function framework, which 
in some senses can be likened to a modi=ed version of the Taylor Rule (TR), which was 
=rst proposed by John Taylor in 1993. <e initial idea behind the TR was that central 
banks could set their interest rates by following a simple formula based on in>ation 
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and output gaps. Later, Taylor himself and many others elaborated on this simple rule 
(Taylor 1999; Hebbel and Werner 2002; McCallum and Nelson 2004) and, at a more 
general level, it has provided the backbone of the new monetary policy (see, among 
others, Romer 2002; Setter=eld 2006). 
In devising a TR-type monetary policy, Woglom (2003, 200) directs our attention 
to the distinction between rules for policy instruments and rules for policy targets. 
While the former speci=es “how the central bank will determine the value of its policy 
instrument such as the short term interest rate,” the latter sets the broad objectives of 
monetary policy. 
We thus hypothesize that a TR framework can be used to capture the changes in the 
responsiveness of the CBRT to di)erent macroeconomic variables in its conduct of 
monetary policy. Before taking further steps, however, it should be noted at the outset 
that we do not claim that the CBRT has o&cially followed a variant of the TR. In other 
words, we do not aim either to set or to discover a speci=c TR for the Turkish economy. 
Rather, our purpose is to check, ex post, which explanatory variables were signi=cant in 
explaining the historically observed behaviour of the Bank’s interest rate from 2002 to 
the end of 2008. Hence our method joins the authors cited above in its use of the TR—
that is, rather than using it as a forward rule in setting the interest rate policy, we will 
use it to elucidate the CBRT’s responses to changes in macroeconomic variables from 
2002 to 2008. Furthermore, as we discuss below, our reaction function speci=cation is 
broader than the standard TR-type speci=cations.
A. Data and Periodization
<e period of our econometric analysis covers monthly observations on various macro 
prices and aggregates from July 2002 to December 2008. Di)erent speci=cations of the 
following simple dynamic equation were implemented to investigate which variables 
had been signi=cant in explaining the monetary policy behind the interest rate. Our 
main model runs as follows:
??????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????? ? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
<e above model can be seen as an augmented TR equation. Some models use real 
interest rates as dependent variables instead of nominal rates. Although this method 
could be used, we think using nominal interest rates is more relevant, because changes 
in nominal interest rates are genuine responses of central banks, given the fact that 
they cannot directly control the real rates. We speci=cally used the overnight interest 
rate, because this has been the Bank’s main policy instrument. <e CBRT started using 
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its overnight (O/N) interest rate as its main policy instrument a*er 2002.11 <e data is 
available on the Bank’s web page.
For in>ation we used annual changes in the consumer price index (CPI) for each 
month as reported by the Turkish Statistics Institute (Turkstat).12 <e expected sign of 
this variable is positive due to the fact that central banks try to curb in>ation by increas-
ing their policy rates, which are supposed to decrease aggregate demand through the 
di)erent channels of the transmission mechanism. It can further be argued that using 
changes in the consumer price index as an explanatory variable can be misleading 
in explaining the behaviour of a central bank, because central banks might generally 
consider the deviation between the targeted in>ation rate and the expected in>ation 
rate when they implement an in>ation targeting strategy. Hence, we further checked 
whether our results would change when we made use of “targeted in>ation minus ex-
pected in>ation” as an explanatory variable instead of the lagged in>ation rate. Annual 
expected in>ation data for each month has been collected by the Bank since 2001 and 
is available on the Bank’s web page. A*er 2002, the CBRT started announcing only 
one annual target for “end of the year”; to convert the end-of-year in>ation target into 
monthly segments, we created a monthly series by using a linear transformation based 
on a linearly gradually decreasing gap between the previous year’s in>ation target and 
the current year’s in>ation target (see the Appendix for further details). Given that the 
central banks would tend to raise interest rates to curb in>ationary pressures, if the 
expected in>ation rate is greater than the targeted in>ation rate, the expected sign of 
the in>ation coe?cient is positive too. 
In order to account for the output gap, we used industrial production index. To solve 
the seasonality problem we =rst used the X-12 method. <en we obtained the potential 
output by using the classical Hodrick-Prescott =lter. We de=ned output gap as actual 
output minus potential output. <e expected sign of the coe?cient is positive, as the 
central bank is assumed to increase its interest rate in response to positive gap between 
actual and potential output. 
In most of the “simple” versions of the TR equations, only the in>ation rate and in-
come gap variables were commonly used as explanatory variables. In its more modern 
treatment, the nominal interest rate in lag form has become a standard component 
of the TR equations, which we regard as an indication of the interest rate smoothing 
practices of central banks. <e expected sign of the coe?cient of interest lag is positive 
under the hypothesis of interest rate smoothing—that is, the central banks would main-
tain the sign of the past period Rt-1 in setting their current rate, Rt. High responsive-
ness to the lagged interest rate and small coe?cients of other variables in the reaction 
11.   However, the Bank used to manoeuvre its overnight rates actively in the preceding period as 
well. In fact, given that the CBRT abandoned its regulatory controls on the capital markets a*er the 
onset of deregulation, the Bank’s overnight interest rates had always been an important indicator 
of its monetary policy even before 2002. As Aksoy and León-Ledesma (2005, 6) point out “even if 
monetary aggregates or short term interest rates are not used as operating targets these can be used 
as indicator variables if these contain useful information …” 
12.   Although the original data is disseminated by Turkstat, we obtained the data from the Bank’s 
web page. 
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function can be seen as important indicators of high interest rate smoothing (Sack and 
Wieland 1999).13,14
Ball (2000) argues that for open economies an exchange rate variable should also be 
included in the TR equations, because central banks have to take developments in the 
exchange markets into account for their objectives. Indeed, movements in the exchange 
rate can be a very important determinant of the central banks’ behaviour, especially 
in developing countries, where exchange rate volatility is high and can even threaten 
=nancial stability. Central banks may have to protect exchange rates from depreciation 
by increasing their interest rates in an attempt to counter the pass-through e)ects of 
higher foreign prices on domestic in>ation. By the same token, they may attempt to 
protect their domestic currency from excessive appreciation by decreasing their policy 
rates based on competitiveness considerations. For our analysis, we use a real exchange 
rate index (based on consumer price index) calculated and reported by the Bank. Based 
on these considerations, the expected sign of the coe?cient is negative.
Furthermore, it can be argued that foreign rates of interest are also important in af-
fecting the behaviour of =nancial agents in open economies, which, in turn, can a)ect 
the developing country central banks’ policy responses. We thus included the Federal 
Reserve’s policy interest rates (short-term overnight interest rates) mainly to capture 
such international arbitrage e)ects.15 <e e)ective Federal Reserve Funds Rate, which 
is available on the Fed web page, is used in our analysis. It is expected that an increase 
in the Fed’s interest rate would typically generate a signalling e)ect and would lead to 
a higher interest rate in a small, open economy. <ereby, the expected sign of the coef-
=cient of the world interest rate variable is positive.
13.   A similar method to check the interest rate smoothing tendency of central banks is used by 
Orphanides and Wieland (1998).
14.   Some authors used a di)erent method to analyze interest rate smoothing (see Judd and Rude-
busch 1998; Drew and Plantier 2000; Woodford 2003). <is method can be summarized as follows:
Rt – Tt–1 = ?(R*t – Rt–1) + δ (Rt–1 – Rt–2)
Rt = (1 – ?) Rt–1 + ?R*t  + δ (Rt–1 – Rt–2)
R*t  = r* + ∝0?(?t – ?*t) + ∝1?(ygapt) = 
n
∑
2
 ∝nVt
Where Rt  is nominal interest rate, R*t is desired real interest rate, ?t is in>ation rate, ?*t  is tar-
geted in>ation rate, ygapt is the di)erence between actual and potential income, and Vt is vectors of 
variables that can be considered important for a central bank’s decision making procedure. Here, 
(1 – ?) indicates the interest rate smoothing of a central bank. Although this method is very appealing 
because of its easiness and its partial adjustment nature, we do not prefer it, because it assumes that 
there are desired interest rates which can be obtained from a Taylor type of reaction function. How-
ever, =rst, in general, central banks may not have desired interest rates in mind. Second, even if they 
have desired rates in mind, we do not believe that a central bank reaction function can give us these 
desired rates—because this requires that a central bank’s decisions are mostly driven by a Taylor type 
framework. As we pointed out, we only want to use a reaction function to assess the sensitiveness of a 
central bank to di)erent macroeconomic indicators. And, as opposed to those who used this method, 
we do not start with a claim that central banks signi=cantly utilize a Taylor type of monetary rule in 
their decision-making process. 
15.   Sinclair (2005) also uses the Federal Reserve rate to check the impact of foreign interest rates.
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B. Regression Analysis
For our econometric analysis, as a benchmark case, we use a simple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. To address possible unit root problems, we implement our 
framework with the di)erences of the variables. Moreover, to address possible endoge-
neity problems, we further use a general methods of moments (GMM) method.
In the literature, the Taylor type of regression results have been criticized because 
of the ignorance of the stability of the variables used in the regressions. (See, e.g., Os-
terholm 2003). Hence, before running regressions we checked whether variables have 
unit root problems. However, unit root tests notoriously demonstrate lack of statistical 
power. So we employed three di)erent unit root tests for the whole period and sub-pe-
riods to decide whether our variables su)er from unit root problems. Speci=cally, these 
tests are agumented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron (P-P), and Kwiatkowski-Phil-
lips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test statistics. Results can be followed in Table 1. <e results 
are ambiguous.16 <ere is no de=nite picture which can fully prevent us from using an 
OLS framework. However, there is enough sign to be cautious about relying on OLS 
regression results. <erefore, we will also use the di)erences of our variables to address 
possible unit root problems. 
In our regression speci=cation with expected in>ation minus targeted in>ation vari-
able, we expected to encounter endogeneity problems. For example, the expected in-
>ation variable may be in>uenced by the current overnight interest rates. Economic 
agents may expect lower expected in>ation in response to a tighter monetary policy 
stance. But since monetary policy exerts its in>uence on other variables in our regres-
sion equation with several lags, there is no theoretical reason to worry about endogene-
ity problems with other variables.17 
Table 1. Unit root results
  Constant Constant and trend None
Variables ADF P-P KPSS ADF P-P KPSS ADF P-P
  T-stat Adj. t-stat
LM 
stat. T-stat
Adj. 
t-stat
LM 
stat T-stat
Adj. 
t-stat
Lag overnight interest 
rate -3.02 -3.25 0.84* -1.89* -1.73 0.27* -3.41 -4.08
In!ation (change in 
CPI) -4.75 -7.62 0.87* -4.07 0.00 0.29 -5.51* -6.79
16.   <e ambiguity of unit root results prevented us from using a co-integration analysis and an 
error correction model. Since we employed di)erent robustness checks methods, this may not be very 
big handicap for our analysis. 
17.   We checked if other variables are endogenous by using formal tests as well. <ese test sta-
tistics do not suggest an important endogeneity problem with other variables. Test statistics can be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Income gap -1.40* -4.53 0.07 0.15* -4.42 0.07 -1.50* -4.58
Fed rate -3.20 -0.72* 0.53 -3.25 0.86* 0.19 -0.80* -0.71*
Appreciation -1.93* -1.93* 1.04* -4.57 -3.25 0.05 0.17* 0.29*
Expected in!ation 
-targeted in!ation -3.23 -3.131 0.86* -3.00* -3.01* 0.13 -3.68 -3.43
* Indicates possible unit root problem.
ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics; P-P: Philips-Perron test statistics, KPSS: Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistics. 
Null hypothesis of ADF and P-P: variable has a unit root; null hypothesis of KPSS: variable is stationary.
Instrumental variable (IV) or GMM techniques can further be used to address en-
dogeneity problems. We will use a GMM estimation method for this part. One crucial 
issue concerning IV or GMM is =nding relevant instruments. <e valid instruments 
must have high correlation with the variables considered endogenous and must be 
orthogonal to the errors of the original regression. Furthermore, implementing more 
valid instruments than the number of endogenous variables can produce relatively 
more e?cient results. We use the =rst lag values of the actual in>ation rate and the 
second lag values of the expected in>ation minus targeted in>ation variable.18 Although 
previous period in>ation rates may have high correlation with the current expected 
in>ation, past in>ation is not expected to be a)ected by current change in the overnight 
interest rate. <e di)erences or the lag values of the variables are commonly used as 
instruments as well. <ereby, potentially the =rst lag values of the in>ation rate and the 
second lag of expected in>ation minus targeted in>ation can serve as the instruments. 
As can be seen from the GMM regression (Table 5), these instruments successfully 
passed the redundancy, weak identi=cation, and orthogonality tests. Weak identi=ca-
tion tests check for the joint signi=cance of the instruments, whereas the redundancy 
test investigates individual signi=cance of the speci=ed instrument(s). In other words, 
these tests investigate if there is enough correlation between instruments and the speci-
=ed endogenous variable(s). Hansen’s J-test is used to check the orthogonality condi-
tion (for details see notes in Table 5).
1. Dealing with Autocorrelation, Heteroskedasticity and Multicollinearity Problems
Regardless of the technique used for an econometric analysis, heteroskedasticity, auto-
correlation, and multicollinearity problems can signi=cantly distort time series econo-
metric results. 
18.   Several other instruments such as the =rst and the second di)erences and the =rst lag of and 
the third lag of the expected in>ation minus targeted in>ation variable were also tried as instruments. 
However, they failed either the redundancy test or the orthogonality test. 
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Multicollinearity is one of the facts of life for many time series practitioners. In the 
presence of multicollinearity problem, regression results may not di)erentiate the im-
pact of independent variables correlated with each other. Our regressions do not seem 
to su)er from multicollinearity problems. Variance in>ation factors as a measure of 
multicollinearity can be found in Table 2.19
In the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, regular standard 
errors cannot be used for signi=cance and other tests. We reported autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity test results in each tables. For the regressions with levels, we 
used Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity with the null hypoth-
esis that the residuals have a constant variance. A White test was used to investigate 
heteroskedasticity for the regressions with di)erences. A Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
was employed to check autocorrelation problems. As Baum, Scha)er, and Stillman 
(2007) suggest, a Cumby-Huizinga test with the null hypothesis that errors are not 
autocorrelated at order 1 and a Pagan-Hall general test with the null hypothesis that 
the disturbance is homoskedastic were utilized in the GMM regression. Whenever test 
results indicate that there is only a heteroskedasticity problem, heteroskedasticity ro-
bust standard errors are used for signi=cance tests. Whenever test results indicate that 
there are autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity problems, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust test statistics obtained from a Newey-West procedure are used 
for signi=cance tests (see notes in the regression tables for further information).
Table 2. Multicollinearity statistics (variance in!ation factors)
Levels Di$erences
Variables For regression 1 For regression 2 For regression 3 For regression 4
Lag overnight interest 
rate 3.56 14.9 1.02 1.26
Exchange rate 
appreciation 2.43 2.7 1.10 1.06
Fed rate 1.57 1.5 1.07 1.07
Income gap 1.11 1.1 1.02 1.03
Expected in!ation 
-targeted in!ation 2.17   1.04  
In!ation (change in CPI)   10.5   1.25
2. Findings
<ere are three robust =ndings of this study. First, the Bank’s interest rate smoothing 
tendency is the main determinant of its monetary policy in this period. <e coe?cient 
of the interest rate smoothing variable is 0.947 and 0.888 in the regressions with levels; 
it is 0.521 and 0.341 when we used the di)erences of the variables in the regressions. All 
19.  ? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
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other coe?cients are very small relative to the interest rate smoothing variable. <is 
is a further support for the argument that the Bank maintained its in>ation targeting 
framework by mainly following an interest rate smoothing strategy during this period. 
Second, the CBRT does not seem to be responsive to the developments in real economy 
(output). Our econometric results indicate that the coe?cients of income gap variable 
are very small and insigni=cant in all regressions. <ird, although in>ation targeting 
central banks are not supposed to pay attention to exchange rates, the CBRT appears 
to be slightly responsive to changes in the real exchange rate. However, the coe?cients 
of this variable are relatively small. 
Furthermore, there are two more secondary =ndings, which are not as robust as 
the =rst set of =ndings: <e CBRT seems to pay attention to changes in the consumer 
price index rather than the di)erence between expected and targeted in>ation. Second, 
changes in international interest rates represented by the Fed rate might have played 
a role in the determination of the bank’s policy rate. However, as stated before, these 
results should be cautiously interpreted. 
We reported our results in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Table 3 presents regression results with 
the levels of variables. <e coe?cients in column 1 belong to the regression includ-
ing expected in>ation minus targeted in>ation. Column 2 displays the second set of 
coe?cients obtained from the regression equation including consumer price index. 
<e results from these two regressions are very close to each other. All variables have 
their expected signs. <e coe?cients of the interest rate smoothing variable are 0.947 
and 0.88 in regression 1 and in regression 2 respectively. <ey are signi=cant at the 1% 
signi=cance level. <e exchange rate and the Fed rate interest rate are also signi=cant 
in both cases, though they are not as important as the interest rate smoothing variable 
in explaining the policy rate. 
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Table 3. Regression results (levels)
  1 2
Variables Coe%cient Std. error Coe%cient Std. error
Interest rate smoothing variable 
(lag overnight interest rate) 0.947*** 0.020 0.888*** 0.046
Income gap 0.016 0.014 0.020 0.016
Expected in!ation - targeted 
in!ation 0.022 0.035    
Exchange rate appreciation -0.059*** 0.020 -0.066*** 0.022
Fed rate 0.274*** 0.081 0.243** 0.100
In!ation (change in CPI)     0.053 0.037
Constant^ 6.694*** 2.509 8.385*** 2.863
No. of observations 82 82
Prob > F 0 0
R-squared 0.9938 0.994
Heteroskedasticity test 0.0062 0.0045
AUTOCORRELATION TEST
lags(p) Prob > chi2 Prob > chi2
1 0.1017 0.0364
2 0.2417 0.1037
3 0.0454 0.022
4 0.0679 0.0395
5 0.0939 0.0487
*** Indicates 1% signi"cance level; ** indicates 5% signi"cance level; * indicates 10% signi"cance level. 
Heteroskedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test with the null hypothesis that the residuals 
have a constant variance. 
Autocorrelation Test: Breusch-Godfrey LM test with the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation. 
P values are reported for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation tests. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation test statistics were obtained from the regular OLS regressions. Whenever test results 
indicate that there is only a heteroskedasticity problem, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
are used for signi"cance tests. Whenever test results indicate that there are autocorrelation and/or 
heteroskedasticity problems, heteroskedasticty and autocorrelation robust test statistics obtained 
from Newey-West procedure are used for signi"cance tests. In this sprit, the standards errors for 
the "rst regression estimation are heteroskedasticity robust. The standards errors for the second 
regressions are obtained from Newey-West procedure. 
Table 4 presents regression results with the di)erences of the variables. <e interest 
rate smoothing coe?cients are still the largest coe?cients with a signi=cance level of 
1%. <e coe?cients of the exchange rate variable are still signi=cant in the regression 
including expected minus targeted in>ation and in the regression including the change 
in the consumer price index. Although the Fed rate lost its signi=cance, the regression 
results in column 4 imply that the Bank seems to be responsive to changes in consumer 
price index. 
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Table 4. Regression results (di$erences)
  3 4
Variables (in di$erence form) Coe%cient Std. error Coe%cient Std. error
Interest rate smoothing variable (lag 
overnight interest rate 0.521*** 0.107 0.341*** 0.095
Income gap -0.013 0.020 -0.008 0.021
Expected in!ation - targeted in!ation 0.037 0.090    
Appreciation -0.080** 0.033 -0.081*** 0.029
Fed rate 0.828 0.518 0.889 0.557
In!ation (change in CPI)     0.273*** 0.064
No. of observations 81 81
Prob > F 0 0
R-squared 0.3269 0.4562
Heteroskedasticity test 0.8188 0.3814
AUTOCORRELATION TEST
lags(p) Prob > chi2 Prob > chi2
1 0.0192 0.7988
2 0.0005 0.9028
3 0.0018 0.3599
4 0.0007 0.1137
5 0.0017 0.1818
(1) *** Indicates 1% signi"cance level; ** indicates 5% signi"cance level; * indicates 10% signi"cance 
level. 
(2) Heteroskedasticity test: White’s test with the null hypothesis that the residuals have a constant 
variance. Autocorrelation test: Breusch-Godfrey LM test with the null hypothesis that there is no serial 
correlation. P values are reported for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation tests. Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation test statistics were obtained from the regular OLS regressions. 
(3) Whenever test results indicate that there is only heteroskedasticity problem, heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are used for signi"cance tests. Whenever test results indicate that there are 
autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity problems, heteroskedasticty and autocorrelation robust 
test statistics obtained from Newey-West procedure are used for signi"cance tests. In this sprit, the 
standard errors for the "rst regression estimation are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust. 
Since there are no heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems in the second regression, original 
standard errors are used for signi"cance tests.
<e results obtained from the GMM technique are presented in Table 5. If the spec-
i=ed variable is endogenous, with the valid instruments, GMM estimates are more 
consistent and have large sample normal distribution properties. Although we estab-
lished that our instruments are valid instruments, we still need to test the validity of 
the endogeneity of the speci=ed variable. We used the Durbin-Wu-Haussman type of 
endogeneity test, which is robust to various violations of conditional homoskedasticity 
(Baum, Scha)er, and Stillman 2007). However, the variable expected in>ation minus 
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targeted in>ation failed to pass the endogeneity test. <is means that OLS estimators 
are consistent and fully e?cient relative to GMM estimates. In other words, OLS results 
are preferred over GMM results. However in small samples, it would be di?cult to es-
tablish the endogeneity of a variable. Hence, for the sake of an extra robustness check, 
we will also brie>y discuss the GMM results. <ese are very close to those obtained 
from OLS results. <e interest rate smoothing coe?cient is very large and signi=cant. 
Furthermore, the Fed and exchange rate variables seem to be signi=cant too. <e CBRT 
is not responsive to developments in income.
Table 5. GMM regression results
5
Variables Coe%cient Std. error
Expected in!ation - targeted in!ation -0.027 0.032
Interest rate smoothing variable 0.932*** 0.017
Income gap 0.012 0.020
Appreciation -0.055*** 0.015
Fed rate 0.247*** 0.087
Constant 6.794*** 1.910
No. of observations 82
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.9936
  Test-statistics P values or critical values
Autocorrelation 4.1871191 0.04073226
Heteroskedasticity test 4.314 0.0378
Under-identi"cation 8.511 0.0142
Redundancy 10.78 0.001
Weak identi"cation 81.794 19.93
Orthogonality test 0.059 0.8088
Endogeneity 11.489 0.0184
*** Indicates 1% signi"cance level; ** indicates 5% signi"cance level; * indicates 10% signi"cance level. 
Autocorrelation test: Cumby-Huizinga test with null hypothesis that errors not autocorrelated 
at order. Heteroskedasticity test: Pagan-Hall general test with the null hypothesis that the 
disturbance is homoskedastic. Under-identi!cation test: The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is 
with the null hypothesis that the speci"ed endogenous regressor is under-identi"ed by the speci"ed 
instruments. Redundancy test: IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of speci"ed instruments) 
with the null hypothesis that the speci"ed instrument is redundant. Weak identi!cation test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic with the null hypothesis that instrument(s) are weakly correlated 
with the speci"ed endogenous variable(s). Orthogonality test: Hansen’s J-statistic with the null 
hypothesis that the speci"ed instruments are not correlated with error terms. Endogeneity test: 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test with the null hypothesis that the speci"ed regressor is endogenous. 
Formally, this test assesses if the OLS estimator is consistent and fully e%cient. 
P values are reported for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, under-identi"cation, redundancy, 
orthogonality, and endogeneity tests. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% signi"cance 
level is reported for weak identi"cation test. 
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Since the regression seems to have both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, as Baum, 
Scha$er, and Stillman (2007) suggest, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 
are used for all test statistics.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied how the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has 
reacted to changes in the economic conditions from 2002 to the end of 2008. Using 
econometric methods on a generalized form of a Taylor Rule, we searched for the pos-
sible revelation of a variety of determinants of monetary policy with di)erent objectives 
in this period. Our =ndings suggest that the lagged interest variable is the most robust 
signi=cant variable under all speci=cations. Another robust =nding is that the output 
gap variable was not signi=cant in any of our speci=cations. Hence, it can be argued 
the CBRT’s strong focus on “interest rate smoothing” is apparent during this period, 
and the Bank persistently ignored (or had to ignore) the developments in output gap 
in designing its interest rate policy. <ese results are statistically signi=cant in all cases 
and in all periodizations and robust to a large range of di)erent speci=cations. <e 
movements in the real exchange rate seemed to in>uence the Bank’s interest rate policy, 
although the magnitude of the coe?cient of this variable turns out to be very small. 
<ere is some econometric evidence that the current in>ation rather than the “expected 
minus targeted in>ation rate” seemed to be the main determinant of the interest rate 
policy decisions of the Bank. Furthermore, there is some econometric evidence that 
international interest rates might have a)ected the Bank’s decisions, though this point 
needs further investigation.
It can be argued that, under the constraints of the global =nancial markets, the Turk-
ish central bank was conditioned to following an interest rate smoothing strategy for 
at least three reasons. First of all, rising volatility along with associated uncertainty and 
fragility might make it almost impossible to assess the true fundamentals of the econ-
omy. Secondly, and related to the =rst point, the CBRT has several times only passively 
responded to shocks to the economy, as it probably was not “con=dent” about the out-
comes of its policies (i.e., the reaction of markets). Trying to keep interest rates stable 
for a su?ciently long time can thus be seen as a remedy against this self-acclaimed 
non-assurance, in order to enhance “credibility.” <irdly, even when the Bank could 
have correctly assessed the situation, its instruments might simply turn out to be inef-
fective, and the Bank might surrender to the pressures of domestic and international 
arbitrageurs. 
interest rate smoothing and macroeconomic instability 393
Appendix: Calculation of Monthly Targeted Rates
Our method for calculating the monthly in>ation targets is as follows: First, the equa-
tion of the line connecting the previous year’s target with the current year’s target, as 
in the graph below, is obtained using available information. <en, using this equation, 
corresponding in>ation rates are assigned to months of the current year. <is idea is 
based on the fact that the Bank has a target path for the end year target in>ation rate. 
<is is in line with the TCB’s announcements and practices (see, for example, CBRT 
2005, 7, Table 1).
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Figure 2. Calculation of monthly targeted rates
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